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How to Prove FIR & Presumption u/s 113A IEA
21-04-2025 11:52:44 | APS Judicial Academy
LALITA
VERSUS VISHWANATH & ORS., (2025) SC
Timeline
of Key Events
- 2010- Dev Kanya married Vishwanath; alleged harassment began by husband, in-laws, and his first wife.
- 2011- Dev Kanya committed suicide by jumping into a well; her father filed an FIR alleging harassment.
- Police investigated, collected evidence (post-mortem, forensics), and filed a charge-sheet against four accused.
- 2012- Trial Court convicted all accused under Sections 306, 498A, and 34 IPC, sentencing them to 10 years in prison.
- High Court acquitted all accused, finding insufficient evidence.
- 2017- Dev Kanya’s mother, Lalita, appealed to the Supreme Court.
- 2025- Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal.
- Did the accused—Dev Kanya’s husband and his family—abet her suicide (Section 306 IPC) or commit cruelty (Section 498A IPC) with a common intention (Section 34 IPC)?
- Whether Section 113A of the Evidence Act (presumption of abetment in dowry-related suicides) could be invoked?
- Can the contents of the FIR be proved by the Investigating Officer when the informant dies before trial?
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by Dev Kanya’s mother, upholding the High Court’s acquittal of the accused. It ruled:
- No Conviction for Abetment or Cruelty: The evidence did not sufficiently prove that the accused instigated or aided Dev Kanya’s suicide (Section 306 IPC) or subjected her to cruelty (Section 498A IPC) with common intention (Section 34 IPC).
- FIR Not Substantive Evidence: The FIR’s contents could not be used as primary evidence since the father died of natural causes, and the Investigating Officer could only confirm the FIR’s existence, not its details.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning was grounded in several legal principles and factual findings:
- No Proof of Abetment: Section 306 IPC requires proof of active instigation or intentional aiding, not just general harassment. Mere harassment or cruelty is not sufficient to invoke abetment unless there is proof of direct aid or instigation.
The Court noted that harassment, even if true, doesn’t automatically mean abetment unless it clearly leaves the victim with no other option, a high bar not met here. Allegations of dowry demands or pressure to transfer land lacked corroboration strong enough to link them to her decision to end her life. There wasn’t enough evidence to show the accused directly encouraged or aided Dev Kanya’s suicide.
- Limits of Section 113A Presumption: Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act allows courts to presume abetment in suicide cases involving cruelty, but the Court clarified this presumption isn’t automatic. There must first be cogent evidence of harassment or cruelty.
Here, the evidence was too weak to trigger this presumption, such as vague claims about land disputes without direct ties to the suicide.
- FIR as Substantive Evidence: The Court emphasized that when the informant (here, the father) dies before trial, the FIR cannot be proved through the IO under Section 67 of IEA, unless it qualifies under Section 32 IEA. The IO could only verify the FIR was filed and identify signatures.
Precedents Relied Upon
The Supreme Court referred to several precedents to support its reasoning:
- Ram Pyarey v. State of U.P., (2025 SC) This recent case clarified the limited scope of Section 113A IEA, more particularly in what manner it shall be applied. Distinguishing it from Section 113B IEA, the court held “When the Courts below want to apply Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the condition precedent is that there has to be first some cogent evidence as regards cruelty & harassment. In the absence of any cogent evidence as regards harassment or abetment in any form like aiding or instigating, the court cannot straightway invoke Section 113A and presume that the accused abetted the commission of suicide.”
- Munna Raja v. State of M.P., AIR 1976 SC 2199 It was noted that there are plethora of decisions taking the view that an F.I.R. can be a dying declaration if the informant dies of his injuries after lodging the same.
- Harkirat Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1997 SC 3231 It was observed that FIR is not substantive evidence if informant is deceased and cannot be cross-examined. For an F.I.R. lodged by a deceased person to be treated as substantial, its contents must be proved. It has to be corroborated and proved for there to be any value of the same in the case.
- Hazarilal v. State (Delhi Admin.), AIR 1980 SC 873 It was reiterated that statements made to the police are inadmissible as substantive evidence under Section 162 CrPC, except for specific exceptions such as Section 32 or Section 27 of IEA. Therefore, in case the death of the informant has no nexus with the complaint lodged i.e. he died a natural death and did not succumb to the injuries inflicted on him in relation to a matter, the contents of the F.I.R. would not be admissible in evidence.
- Umrao Singh v. State of M.P., 1961 CrLJ 270 (MP HC) It was observed that FIR itself could not be treated as substantive evidence of the facts it alleged. The contents of an FIR cannot be used to prove the facts it states unless the person who lodged the FIR (the informant) testifies in court and is subject to cross-examination. It could only be used for limited purpose of corroboration or contradiction of other evidence, as per Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act. The court further distinguished between proving that an FIR exists (which is straightforward and can be done by the IO) and proving that its contents are true (which requires independent evidence). The court emphasized that the IO’s testimony is limited to confirming the existence of the FIR. IO can testify about procedural aspects, such as the fact that the FIR was lodged, who lodged it, and when it was lodged. However, the IO cannot testify about the truth of the FIR’s contents because they are not a witness to the events described in the FIR.