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Assessing the Implications of Madhya Pradesh High Court's Verdict on Judicial Service Amendment

22-04-2025 12:42:02 | APS Judicial Academy

Background: A Division Bench comprising of Chief Justice Ravi Malimath and Justice Vishal Mishra, recently addressed a batch of writ petitions challenging an amendment to Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994. The impugned amendment introduced an additional eligibility criterion for the post of Civil Judge, Junior Division, in Madhya Pradesh.
Impugned Amendment: In terms of the amendment, “all those who had practised continuously as an advocate for not less than 3 years on the last date fixed for submission of applications were eligible to apply or in the alternate, an outstanding Law Graduate with a brilliant academic career having passed all exams in the first attempt by securing at least 70% marks in the aggregate in the case of General and OBC categories and at least 50% marks in the aggregate, in case of candidates from the reserved category.”
Analysis: If we were to analyse the impact and ramifications of this amendment which has been upheld by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, we first need to grasp the contextual landscape surrounding it.
Stipulation to Secure an Aggregate of 70%

• Firstly, the requirement of securing at least 70% marks in aggregate in the first attempt for General and OBC candidates, as an alternative to the practice requirement, can easily be viewed as indiscriminate. This stipulation is rather arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as achieving a 70% aggregate in the first attempt is challenging and, in some cases, can be unattainable.
• In fact the variability in marking schemes and patterns among different universities and law colleges, particularly across 3-year and 5-year programs, highlights the potential for arbitrariness in awarding marks. Furthermore, the discrepancy extends to the tendency of some colleges to inflate marks artificially to portray a favourable academic performance.
• It is very well known that various institutions employ diverse marking schemes and evaluation methods, with some placing greater emphasis on internal assessments while others prioritize external examinations. This disparity introduces an element of inconsistency in how marks are allocated to students and imposes an unrealistic and unjust burden on students from institutions with more stringent marking criteria.
• For example, achieving an aggregate of 70% at esteemed establishments such as the Faculty of Law, University of Delhi, is often difficult and still a farfetched dream for almost all students. However, despite this challenge, the institution boasts a history of producing some of the most successful professionals across the legal field, including distinguished figures like the Chief Justice of India and other judges serving in various High Courts and lower courts.
• This disparity in marking practices not only undermines the integrity and fairness of the evaluation process but also creates an uneven playing field for aspiring candidates.

• The High Court has also failed to take note of the situations where a student might have failed to pass all exams on their first try. This stipulation overlooks various circumstances that might prevent a student from doing so. If a student failed from attempting an exam for the first time, they should still be allowed to redeem themselves.
• The court's oversight lies in its failure to acknowledge the diverse circumstances that students may encounter along their educational journey such as personal illness, family emergencies, etc. These setbacks do not accurately reflect their academic potential or dedication. Even though the candidate may not have secured 70% marks in aggregate in the first attempt, he may be a brilliant candidate who would be denied an opportunity of competing in the exam, because of this requirement.

• The imposition of a mandatory three-year practice requirement was done away with by the Apex Court since 2002. In its landmark decision in All India Judges’ Association and others vs. Union of India (2002), the Supreme Court categorically held that such a requirement was no longer obligatory. Instead a one year judicial training program was introduced, pursuant to which State Judicial Academies were established to impart training to the new recruits.
• However, even if for the sake of argument, the court believes that candidates emerging from this training period are still insufficiently prepared for the role, then it is glaringly obvious that the fault lies not with the candidates but with the flawed selection processes and inadequate training standards.
• The Supreme Court has also been seen rebuking the Additional District Level Judges for their sentencing practices and at occasions, mandated their further training for the same. The fact these judges, appointed after seven years of practice and serving for years, still require additional training, exposes a fundamental flaw in the current training regime.
• By attempting to shift the responsibility onto the candidates themselves, the High Court is evading its duty to uphold standards of excellence and meritocracy in the recruitment process. It is abundantly clear that the High Court bears the primary responsibility for ensuring that the recruitment process is rigorous, fair, and transparent. From conducting examinations and interviews to providing training, every step of the process falls under its jurisdiction. Instead of rigorously filtering out mediocrity and selecting the most brilliant candidates, it appears that the High Court is shirking its duty and placing the burden on the applicants.
• Instead of scapegoating candidates, why doesn't the High Court focus on enhancing its one-year training program? This would ensure that new recruits receive comprehensive training in judgment writing, evidence appreciation, and other essential skills in one consolidated program. Why can't the purported three years of practice experience, which barely scratches the surface of courtroom exposure, be incorporated into this training program?

• Additionally, the state's bold proclamation that a mere 70% aggregate in the first attempt equates to ‘brilliance in academic career’ is not just absurd but downright insulting to the intelligence and capabilities of aspiring law graduates. What parameters have been whimsically invented to define this so-called 'brilliant law graduate' or 'brilliant academic career'?
• Furthermore, if we are to accept to such dubious logic, then by what twisted rationale can we justify labelling a 50% aggregate, as prescribed for SC and ST candidates, as 'brilliant'? Such double standards reek of discrimination and blatant disregard for meritocracy.
• The intention of selecting the finest law graduates to become the finest judges is rendered laughable in the face of such misguided criteria. How can we possibly correlate the requirement of a 70% aggregate with accomplishing brilliance in law?
• Are we to believe that excellence can be distilled into a single arbitrary percentage? If it were the case, then we wonder how many sitting Supreme Court or High Court Judges across the country have managed to secure an aggregate of 70%, that too in their first attempt. Or is the Court insinuating that all appointees post All India Judges’ case, who didn't adhere to these new standards, are incompetent or mediocre?
• Moreover, these examinations are administered under the aegis of the High Courts, and the interviews are conducted by esteemed Judicial Officers of the High Court. We firmly believe that these experienced officers possess the competence to sift through the masses and identify the most deserving and brilliant candidates.

• Furthermore, there is a glaring 20% difference between different categories of candidates, specifically General & OBC versus SC & ST categories. Such a substantial difference deviates starkly from the typically observed 5% gap prescribed for qualifying the M.P preliminary judiciary examination, indicating a systemic issue that needs critical examination. Even this difference in their mains examination stands at 5%, begging the question why this staggering 20% gap for deciding the eligibility criteria?
• It raises questions about the criteria used to determine these percentages and whether they are based on any logical and legal reasoning or arbitrary assumptions. Without clear justification for this disparity, it invites skepticism about the underlying motives behind such decisions.

• The absence of clear guidelines regarding post-graduate students in the context of eligibility is a fundamental flaw in the prescribed standards. Will LL.M. or Ph.D. students who haven't achieved a 70% aggregate in LLB, but have opted for further education, be required to undergo three additional years of practical experience just to qualify for the judiciary exam? This seems not only illogical but also unjustifiably burdensome and counterproductive.
• Additionally, in fact even though the amendment is said to have a prospective application of the amendment, it will have a retrospective effect on certain students. Those candidates, who have diligently pursued their higher education while simultaneously prepa

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